Talk:Classical pantheism

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This page is not only devoid of all sources, but is completely misleading and inaccurate. Naturalistic (talk) 01:29, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Jack:

For All Classical Pantheists, "GOD" can be either a personal or an impersonal GOD of Cosmos or both/and or All.

Do you not understand?

Paul Vogel

http://www.cosmotheism.net

God

God is personal. Jack 02:54, 27 Jan 2004 (UTC)

Yes, GOD is personal, as it is WITHIN you, me, everything that is.

From that POV, GOD is personal.

When GOD is COSMOS, GOD can also be impersonal, as when it is WITHIN a rock, the sun, the earth, or a flower, or the LAWS of NATURE.

I happen to believe that GOD is BOTH PERSONAL and IMPERSONAL at one and the same time and place, as GOD is EVERYWHERE and is WITHIN EVERYTHING, whether having a "PERSONALITY" or not.

Do you understand, Jack?

Best regards,

Paul Vogel

http://www.cosmotheism.net

no, but I don't mind the current version. Sam Spade 23:15, 16 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Ok, just like light is both a particle and a wave, at one and the same time and place, so is GOD both personal and impersonal, at one and the same time and everyplace. Understand? Even if not, I am glad that you don't mind the current version, Jack, I mean, Sam. :D

I don't see how refering to him is as impersonal is accurate in any way (I have a close and personal relationship with God) and I reccomend you study the concept of atman. On the other hand, the version (as I last checked it) kept the matter as one held by an individual believer, and I feel that is accurate, as you clearly feel the way you do, and probably many people feel the way they do (variously), about God. Sam Spade 14:41, 18 Feb 2004 (UTC)

GOD is accurately "impersonal", and is "non-gender specific", or is atman when referring to the Cosmic Laws of Nature. GOD is accurately "personal", when you do have a close and a personal relationship with and to GOD/COSMOS, within. Understand? [1] -PV

Reinstated Page

I have reinstated this page and added reliable background and source material. Please be advised that the term "Classical Pantheism" on Google search comes up with many unreliable and unsourced material from an old entry from Wikipedia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Allisgod (talk • contribs) 07:02, 13 June 2012 (UTC)

It is a good idea to reinstate the page, so that an accurate description of the usage of this term can be presented. In truth usage is all over the map because usage of the word "classical" when applied to any set of ideas or styles is also all over the map. People add the adjective classical to many other nouns in many different ways.

What was presented was a completely new version - not a reinstatement of the old. Nothing wrong with that, because the old version was very bad in many respects. However, what replaced it was also deficient in many respects.

1. It presented Classical pantheism as a distinct category of pantheism - but Classical pantheism has never been such a category. Usage of the term varies widely as described in the version I edited. Hartshorne never presented it as part of a typology of versions of pantheism. When qualifying it he would usually add Spinoza and or Stoics in brackets to illustrate what he meant. Persons included in his Classical pantheism chapter of Philosophers speak of God are a fairly arbitrary set (Ashvagosa, Sankara, Ramanuja, Stoics, Spinoza, Royce, Robinson Jeffers).

2. The three books focussing on Pantheism that are currently in publication (Levine, Harrison, Russell) make no mention of a typology that includes Classical pantheism as one of its members.

3. The article as edited by Allisgod was based on Hartshorne's usage - but Hartshorne did not coin this term nor did he define it and i using it he basically meant "typical pantheism" ie typical in his own estimation.

4. The article went way beyond Hartshorne, adding people like Raphson for whom empty space was God, Einstein who was naturalistic and physicalist, and adding additional OR and POV material of various kinds.

5. Cooper does not say "Classical Pantheists like Raphson and Spinoza tend not to limit or minimize the definition of the "God"" or anything remotely resembling that on p 71-72 of Panentheism.

6. The final section on types of pantheism closer to theism and to atheism has nothing to do with the article subject.--Naturalistic (talk) 23:45, 14 June 2012 (UTC)

Classical Pantheism is the only variety of Pantheism EVER created by a major philosopher. Your attempts to remove this information and belittle these facts are a result of what you have admitted twice now on the pantheism talk page - that you are concerned with how it makes your version of pantheism look. Sorry, but that is not a valid concern nor is it appropriate to remove the information because you disagree with it.

Still, I have corrected your concerns #4, 5 and 6 by removing the information since you find it controversial. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Allisgod (talk • contribs) 17:39, 15 June 2012 (UTC)

I believe that you are mistaken in your understanding of Hartshorne. It's clear from the chapter list that he was not setting out to create a category of Pantheism called "classical" and distinct from other forms. Where does he give a list of non-classical pantheists or a description of how they differ from classical pantheists? If he did not, then what meaning attaches to the word "classical"? He is just using it in sense number two.

The Classical pantheism chapter is just a parallel with his other chapter "Classical Theism." The concept of determinism is not specifically linked to Pantheism: there are determinist and non-determinist pantheists, atheists and theists as well as pantheists who do not even address that issue. FYI the World Pantheist Movement does not state anywhere that free will exists or does not exist: it takes no position on this issue.--Naturalistic (talk) 19:52, 15 June 2012 (UTC)

Hartshorne does not list non-classical pantheists because he is obviously dismissive of structure-less pantheism.

In regards with those who do not address determinism, that's Hartshorne's reason for creating the distinct category. How can you debate people who take no position on something essential in a systematic pantheism?

He is the ONLY philosopher to create a pantheism distinction. Over 2 dozen published works have acknowledged "Classical Pantheism" and Hartshorne wrote about it in more than one work. If you need a list of all these, I can provide it for you. Your attempt to make it an insignificant item on this page by listing how others use "classical pantheism" is highly disingenuous considering you have been arguing that "Classical Pantheism" does not exist and is irrelevant since it's just a phrase used from an old wikipedia article you removed. Now you add a reference from your own book and list it on top in your edit. That's just beyond ridiculous. (Allisgod (talk) 23:09, 15 June 2012 (UTC))

Well, Allisgod aka Rev Allen White of Unity in Silver Spring, where is your source that for Hartshorne this was a distinction from other types of Pantheism? Where has he written on "non-classical" forms of pantheism contrasting them with classical? His chapter on Classical pantheism is his only chapter on Pantheism, and his goal in that chapter is not to show a typology of Pantheism (a typology requires more than ONE type) but to show the shortcomings of Pantheism as compared to his own favorite, Panentheism.

In addition, your presentation of Einstein's determinism as an example is original research not present in Hartshorne, and your inclusion of effusive praise of Spinoza is completely irrelevant.--Naturalistic (talk) 01:42, 16 June 2012 (UTC)

He made it clear that "Classical Pantheism" refers to deterministic pantheism. In fact, "Encyclopedia of religion: Volume 10; Volume 10" (Lindsay Jones) states

"Classical pantheism was a form of theological determinism: God decides or determines everything, including our supposed decisions. Both the ancient Greek Stoics and Spinoza (1632–1677) held this view. Panentheists object that, if one power determines all, there is, causally speaking, only one agent in all action. The Stoic-Spinozistic doctrine is an extreme monism rather than a genuine pluralism."

I have also removed the references to Einstein/Spinoza (Allisgod (talk) 19:35, 16 June 2012 (UTC))

I was pleasantly surprised to see that this latest version is much more acceptable. Not quite there yet but nearly. I am waiting a copy of Philosophers Speak of God to verify certain things.--Naturalistic (talk) 22:48, 17 June 2012 (UTC)

Here's a link to an interview from 1989 with Hartshorne for reference - http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2803

PG: In your writings you often refer to pantheism.

CH: Yes, I use the phrase classical pantheism and I mean Spinoza and the Stoics. I mean determinism, theological determinism. Now that is a lot different from indeterministic panentheism, where everything is in God but everything is not determined by God. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Allisgod (talk • contribs) 00:45, 18 June 2012 (UTC)

That's a very good reference, thankyou. I am still just a little uncomfortable with using the word "typology." A typology has to have a set of members, not just one - do we know that Hartshorne had such a set? Or did he regard all versions of Pantheism as being deterministic and hence inferior in his opinion to panentheism? --Naturalistic (talk) 18:11, 18 June 2012 (UTC)

Yes, he did have a set based on 5 questions, though he didn't highlight and name all possibilities in the set. It is a typology of possible ways of constructing a theory of God (He calls it a "classification of theistic doctrines"). He uses the phrase "Classical Pantheism" to describe one of the main typologies he discusses to contrast to panentheism. In the above link he says he uses the phrase "Classical Pantheism" to distinguish completely from free will panentheism - which is his view. He sees the difference between his own panentheistic view and Classical Pantheism as God being "Temporal" (i.e. that time exists for God). For Spinoza and the Stoics, time is illusory just like every other distinction.

My speculation: Hartshorne would say 'free will pantheism' is an oxymoron since on the one hand you insist time exists and therefore there is distinguishable cause and effect, yet you are not insisting on a "First Cause" distinguishing from the universe. [I'm not even sure how that counts as "theism" at all. It seems like you put "pan" in place of the "A" in athiesm and just think it's reversible, when in fact people have clear developed deterministic pan-theistic philosophies that are not atheistic.] Of course he also disagrees with Classical Pantheism and he spells out why he thinks that is illogical as well. But he does not title and discuss every possibility in his set - just what he believes are important, which includes "Classical Pantheism". I'm not clear on whether or not 'free will pantheism' would even make it as a possibility of his set. But I'd imagine he was aware of the possibility of 'free will pantheism' but dismissed it as something like an 'anything goes' kind of new age idea that makes no philosophical sense and isn't worth discussing. Just my suspicion since 'free will pantheism' doesn't make any sense to me either, and I wouldn't be discussing it (and I don't think he would be distinguishing it as "Classical Pantheism") unless someone claimed that it could possibly make sense to combine free will and pantheism. Q: Do any notable philosophers or scientists support free will pantheism? (Allisgod (talk) 00:31, 19 June 2012 (UTC))

The free will question is no different in principle for Pantheism than for Theism or Atheism - all three can give determinist, non-determinist or compatibilist answer to this question. Theism with an omniscient omnipotent God has the greatest problems in establishing free will. For the rest, much hinges on what's meant by free will. Can we act without any cause whatsoever of our actions? No of course not. Can we act without a cause external to us, external to the complex decision operations going on inside our brains? Sure we can. Can we reach decisions that nobody could possibly have predicted even with a full knowledge of all external conditions working on us previously and currently? Sure we can. History (including the history of science and of philosophy and of religion) is full of examples of radical unexpected departures.

The only type of Pantheism for which free will presents a difficulty is quasi-theistic Pantheism, where you assume that the Universe/God is perfect and whatever happens is the only thing that could happen (Spinoza), or the Universe has some kind of vast overarching consciousness which drives everything within it according to its will (Stoics). In these two cases we don't have free will. Naturalistic Pantheism does not face those constraints and the question of free will in Naturalistic Pantheism boils down to logic and evidence. Naturalistic Pantheists can and do take either side of the argument.--Naturalistic (talk) 16:18, 19 June 2012 (UTC)

Thanks, but my question was do any notable philosophers or scientists support free will + pantheism? If so, can you name them? (Allisgod (talk) 17:01, 19 June 2012 (UTC))

Daniel Dennett, for one. Surprisingly, Benjamin Libet - the scientist whose research is most widely quoted against free will - does not support hard determinism and says his experiments indicate there would still be room for a conscious "veto" power, moreover that his experiments do nothing to exclude free will in actions that are not quick-fire.--Naturalistic (talk) 17:35, 19 June 2012 (UTC)

Dennett was a soft determinist (which would not conflict with Spinoza). Was Libet a pantheist? I should have posed my question more accurately: Are there any notable philosophers or scientists who believe in an indeterministic pantheism? (Allisgod (talk) 17:59, 19 June 2012 (UTC))

Dennett is usually termed a compatibilist, which is my position. I have not thoroughly researched the free will beliefs of every pantheist, so I can't tell you the answer to your question. Compatibilism is quite a popular position among contemporary philosopher profs.

I don't see anything in the core beliefs of all Pantheisms (divinity or godlikeness of Universe/Nature plus unity) that militates in favor of determinism. Why would Pantheism entail that the future was already determined? Why would cause and effect entail that humans are incapable of acting with great independence from causes external to themselves?--Naturalistic (talk) 18:48, 19 June 2012 (UTC)

Simple Logic - if everything is God, then everything is one (monism). If everything is one, then that includes time and all cause/effect events (determinism).

Compatibilism is still determinism at its core. It's like 'feel good' determinism. The Stoics are also considered compatibilists. Indeterminists (like Aristotle and Kant) tend to separate the mind/body and say the mind has free will but everything else is determined. That's obviously a dualistic belief, and I don't see how that's compatible with pantheism unless it's so-called "dualistic pantheism" (which again sounds like an oxymoron to me). In any case, I find it interesting that Mr. Naturalistic Pantheist may himself be a Classical Pantheist after all. The issue of time is pretty much the most difficult one in philosophy and only the best systematic philosophers deal with it (Spinoza, Stoics, Hegel). Even though, like you, I do not agree with Hartshorne's ultimate position, I commend him for being specific with this category of deterministic pantheism so as to make it distinct from undeveloped and unsystematic views on pantheism (and from so-called dualistic pantheism). (Allisgod (talk) 21:35, 19 June 2012 (UTC))

This "Simple Logic" only works if "God is one" is also one of the premises. If he/she/it has parts, it doesn't work. On what basis should we predefine God as one? Why shouldn't he/she/it have parts?

It does not work for the naturalistic kind of Pantheism that takes the existing Universe as its starting point and chooses to consider the Universe as its God-equivalent. Certainly, in some important respects the Universe is empirically a unity. But in others it is not.

It seems to me like Hartshorne wanted to define Pantheism as necessarily or always deterministic so he could prove its inferiority to Panentheism which is not deterministic. It's a straw man.

According to a very thorough source on the History of Free Will (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/history/), the following people usually classified as pantheists believed in free will or at least compatibilism: Chrysippus and Epictetus (Stoics) and Schelling.--Naturalistic (talk) 22:18, 20 June 2012 (UTC)

Again, a compatibilist is still a determinist - and I agree that is a well researched link

Why would one revere this universe as a God-equivalent if not for its perfect unity? What is the point? Does a person with this view just pick and choose what he/she want to revere and what he/she does not? Is that what pantheism is from this point of view - a way to revere the "parts" of the Universe one enjoys and make then distinct from the "parts" which one does not enjoy?

I think the reason Hartshorne would not bother to engage in debate with this 'kind of pantheism' is because this view is either 1) illogical and without basis, or 2) at best, undeveloped. But that's only if one is a systematic philosopher and not a tree hugging hippie :) (Allisgod (talk) 22:09, 21 June 2012 (UTC))

Hmmm, I thought we had got beyond the insults and allegations phase into a reasonable discussion. Insults have no part in valid argument.

You can second guess why Hartshorne did not address non-deterministic or Naturalistic forms of Pantheism - however, he does not even address these in order to dismiss them. And he should, because these forms do not suffer from what he saw as the central defect of Pantheism: determinism.

To me it seems very plain that he had only a limited view of what Pantheism is, and ignored the basic position that in Pantheism there is no God or God-equivalent other than the Universe itself. There were already examples available to him (Einstein and Haeckel for example) that did not regard the Universe as some "perfect unity" even though they were both deterministic.

The reason that Naturalistic Pantheists revere the Universe is because it has the qualities that Otto attributed to "The Holy" - mystery, awesome power, and beauty. It's very plain that while it does have unity in some respects, in others it does not (animals eat other animals, galaxies collide, meteors crash into planets etc). You can only state that it has perfect unity on the basis of an a priori premise - and where would you get that premise from? How can you justify that premise? In Spinoza it's only a premise, too. Nowhere does he prove it.

How can you reconcile the "perfect unity" with the obvious existence of distinct individual objects or creatures with conflicting interests?--Naturalistic (talk) 22:44, 21 June 2012 (UTC)

I agree that Hartshorne would not see your view as pantheism at all. He would describe it as Atheism. The only thing you offer beyond atheism (a non belief) is that the Universe "has qualities" that are apparently "Holy". And apparently those qualities are distinct from un-holy qualities such as animals eating other animals? My statement about tree hugging hippie was made in jest, not an insult, but to characterize your viewpoint as not a systematic philosophy. Animals eating animals for pantheists like Spinoza and Einstein are Holy events just like anything else. You, on the other hand, just pick and choose what you consider "mystery, awesome power, and beauty". That's not a systematic philosophy. It's just some person's judgment. On your other point, I agree that Spinoza does not have ultimate proof of a perfect unity. Pantheism is a belief system - a theory or estimate of what's going on - like anything else there is no ultimate proof of anything. His belief is based on faith in natural laws and cause and effect, which is based well within his experience.

As for, "obvious existence of distinct individual objects or creatures with conflicting interests," I will first qualify this by saying this is not meant to be an insult. But what's so "obvious" to you, is not obvious to minds such as Spinoza and Einstein. They had an amazing faith in a unified perfection (even with quantum mechanics Einstein did not change his position). Where most people see distinctions, these great minds saw perfect relationships. I think these people would say to you that it's great you have escaped the silliness of a personal God. But it sounds like you still haven't escaped the silliness of getting past your own personal bias and judgment of what is more Holy and less Holy to you. In that sense you are not a pantheist. You revere what you choose to revere without any real systematic basis. That's not PAN-theism. It's Whatever-I-Prefer Theism.(Allisgod (talk) 00:41, 22 June 2012 (UTC))

One more note. I commend you for at least labeling your view as Naturalistic Pantheism rather than just plain pantheism. You indicate clearly that "Nature" is what you prefer to revere. Still, I find the term misleading (and the inclusion of the word pantheism even more misleading). Your view of "Nature" has a bias in favor of butterflies and trees and against "animals eat other animals, galaxies collide, meteors crash into planets etc". Spinoza's Nature was natural laws and would include *everything* that happens and every substance. Spinoza went from a personal God to the complete opposite - that everything and every event is God. You have gone from a personal God to a less personal God - Nature, as you enjoy it. But your appreciation for nature stops where your prejudices of what Nature means to you steps in. So I would say you're close to being a pantheist, but not quite. More like a nature loving atheist who is playing with words. But I do believe that Hartshorne has highlighted something crucial. If you were to recognize the significance of determinism in your nature loving view, then I think that's the point where your biases and prejudices fade and you would be a true believer of natural laws rather than just nature, as you wish to see it. At that point, you would really have a monistic and systematic belief based on rules. You wouldn't have to call it all God, but can be pantheism at that point. Again, this isn't meant to be insulting your POV, but clarifying the significance of Hartshorne's position and applying it to our slightly differing viewpoints. I apologize if I sound arrogant or anything like that, I just think I know what I'm talking about and I wish you could see it from this point of view. (Allisgod (talk) 01:31, 22 June 2012 (UTC))

There's nothing systematically philosophical or sophisticated about positing a perfect deity that has perfect unity. In fact it's a completely arbitrary starting point that is purely a personal choice. It has no ground in reality as experienced on an everyday basis or in the findings of science. Naturalistic Pantheists respect science and the scientific method and believe consistently in natural laws without any time of place - even at the origin of things - where some immaterial being intervened.

Einstein never stated that everything is perfect or has a perfect unity. Please provide quotes that show this.

You say that my view of Nature "has a bias in favor of butterflies and trees and against "animals eat other animals, galaxies collide, meteors crash into planets etc". That's inaccurate. I already stated above that the existence of conflict and colliding galaxies demonstrates that the Universe does not have a "perfect unity." It's you who appears to deny conflict. Naturalistic Pantheists fully accept predation and everything else that they witness in Nature whereas you appear to be living in a cloud cuckoo land where everything is perfect and all that exists is a God of perfect unity.--Naturalistic (talk) 01:33, 25 June 2012 (UTC)

So does Spinoza "appear to be living in a cloud cuckoo land" too? I didn't realize the words "perfect unity" would be so detestable for someone who calls himself a pantheist - by "perfect unity" I simply meant a monistic and deterministic worldview. Einstein's entire life and works were based on and supportive of unified theories and he was a strict determinist who believed the past, present and future are "illusions". The "conflicts of nature" you describe are a part of one event for cuckoos Spinoza and Einstein. If it is one event with no time, it's no longer a "conflict". It is only a conflict from the perspective of an everyday human perception, which is why I noted that your view is closer to a "personal God" than the views of Spinoza/Einstein. In addition, when you say you "respect science", you really aren't saying anything about what you believe. In fact, it suggests you believe in nothing, since science is nowhere near faith based. Theism involves faith. And pantheism is a faith that all is divine. Your view sounds more like 'atheism is divine' since you are worshiping "mystery" and "science" and offering nothing beyond that. You should call it "Divine Skepticism", "Religious Atheism" or something like that if it is limited to what science can offer. I find it a bit misleading to call this pantheism unless you actually offer something in terms of faith.

In any case, your viewpoint, believe it or not, is not that far from mine when I consider it carefully. Fundamentally, I agree with your divine skepticism, but add a faith in determinism (which for me is supported by empirical evidence, but definitely cannot be proven by science). Determinism (and monism) turns my "divine skepticism" into a theism which can best be called pantheism. It gives me a "cuckoo" faith that has been shared by great philosophers and scientists. Though I quibble about the name you use to describe your view, I think it's reasonable to be a "religious atheist" (or "naturalist pantheist", if you insist). I just find your view to be a bit pessimistic and uncreative for my taste (although the name you use is quite creative). But your view (as long as you truly respect science and are not using it to justify biased views) is still just a very small step away from my position if we view it relative to all the other positions out there. So in the end perhaps it's not such a big deal that you're using the word most often associated with Spinoza's philosophy. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Allisgod (talk • contribs) 05:44, 25 June 2012 (UTC)

Well I'm glad to hear that opinion and I'm happy to leave the arguing there. I do have a monistic and deterministic view of the world - but monism comes in different degrees. There's the kind of absolute monism that you and Spinoza and Ibn Arabi have - there is only one entity and that is God, or is divine. And there's a more moderated monism that points to the common origins and current interdependence and interaction of things, as in Naturalistic Pantheism.

I will just point out that I do not regard pantheism as a form of theism (in the sense used by atheists, of a pre-existing creator God), nor is it a form of atheism either, since atheism believes only that there is no God and Naturalistic Pantheism adds way more than that. Generally we avoid theistic words, which for us are not statements of fact but metaphors for our feelings. For us pantheism is not about faith but about feelings. We feel many of the same feelings towards the Universe that theists feel towards their God. We don't need faith for those feelings, any more than someone needs faith for the feelings they have at beautiful sunsets. Have you read the World Pantheist Movement's statement of principles? http://www.pantheism.net/manifest.htm --Naturalistic (talk) 14:24, 25 June 2012 (UTC)

I read them again and I find them all to be very agreeable. I just need a bit more to satisfy my intellect. For example, I agree the feelings of a beautiful sunset are divine, but I think all feelings are equal forms of divinity. So that if I'm staring at a wall, or a dog is hit by a bus right in front of me I can have some deeper awareness like that Wittgenstein quote - "For a truly religious man nothing is tragic." Using or not using words like God, religion and faith are not important to me (which reminds me of the Einstein quote: "I do not share the spirit of the professional atheist whose fervor is mostly due to a painful act of liberation from the fetters of religious indoctrination received in youth."). Pantheism to me is a mature religious faith. Basing it just upon "feelings" of reverence, for me, will not satisfy my deep rooted desires to make some sense of the world, so that I would be left looking elsewhere for truth. I see what you're promoting as a positive step for many people and in that sense I support it. However it is not enough for me and leaves out what I need to hear for it to be relevant for my life.

I guess if you were to criticize my point of view, you could call it extreme or "fundamentalist pantheism" whereas I could think of yours as "pantheism light" (or "environmental pantheism" as I read in another article). It's much too early in the development of pantheism awareness to be breaking into arguing factions of pantheism though. I think it's best to work together to give more people the information they need rather than wasting too much time focusing on minor differences that only a very limited number of people at this time would be interested in. I am still glad we had this discussion as it gave me much more clarity on the basis of our original issues. (Allisgod (talk) 20:40, 25 June 2012 (UTC))

I am glad too and glad to see the Classical pantheism article resurrected in a much more justified form than the old version.

The factions are already there. The WPM has some experience of trying to unite idealist monists, dualists and physicalist monists. The differences are huge not just in theory but in practice too. The Universal Pantheist Society has been open to all kinds of pantheism since 1975 and is tiny. The WPM's (prehistory started in 1996) decided that it's impossible to promote "generic" pantheism and so focuses on one type and is 15-20 times bigger.--Naturalistic (talk) 22:47, 25 June 2012 (UTC)

Are you done arguing about all this yet? XMHNHMX (talk) 20:56, 25 March 2024 (UTC)