User talk:BM/Theodicy

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Parking Area[edit]

Examples of theodicy[edit]

  • Calvinism asserts that all events are part of God's plan, and therefore, though they may appear to be evil to us, God intends them for a higher purpose that only he knows, and they are not evil in God's eyes.
  • Open Theism asserts that although there is a basis for belief in God, there is no basis for belief in God's omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence; and that although God is the most powerful, most loving, and most knowing, he is not infinite. Evil therefore exists really, tangibly, and in direct conflict with God's will.
  • Maltheism asserts that the "problem of evil" is not a problem at all—the initial question has a simple answer, there is no way that a benevolent omnipotent God would allow evil in the world. Therefore, they reason, God is either not benevolent or not omnipotent.
  • "modified Dualism", since the powers of good and evil are unequal, and the evil power is merely tolerated by the good power, who turns all the acts of the evil power into eventual good. Classical Christianity, i.e, from the Apostolic Fathers to Augustine, has been characterized as "modified Dualism". Sts. Augustine and Basil the Great both explicitly mention this idea. St. John of Damascus proposed that God deliberately leaves some events "in our hands". In early modern times (1714) a modified Dualism was advocated by St. John (Maximovitch) of Tobolsk.

Holocaust theology[edit]

Main article: Holocaust theology

In light of the magnitude of evil seen in the Holocaust, many people have re-examined the classical theological views on God's goodness and actions in the world. How can people still have any faith after the Holocaust? There is a separate entry which discusses the theological responses that people have had in response to the Holocaust.

Against theodicy[edit]

The late Mennonite theologian, John Howard Yoder, wrote an unfinished essay entitled "Trinity Versus Theodicy: Hebraic Realism And The Temptation To Judge God" (1996). Yoder argues that "if God be God" then theodicy is an oxymoron and idolatry. As is evident from the subtitle, Yoder is not opposed to attempts to reconcile the existence of a God with the existence of evil; rather, he is against a particular approach to the problem. He does not "deny that there are ways in which forms of discourse in the mode of theodicy may have a function, subject to the discipline of a wider setting."

Anyone with even a passing familiarity with Yoder's life and work would realize that he was deeply concerned and engaged with the problem of evil; specifically, the evil of violence and war and how we resist it. Yoder's "case [is] against garden variety 'theodicy' "--in particular, theodicy as a judgment or defense of God.

Yoder asks:

  • a) Where do you get the criteria by which you evaluate God? Why are the criteria you use the right ones?
  • b) Why [do] you think you are qualified for the business of accrediting Gods?
  • c) If you think you are qualified for that business, how does the adjudication proceed? [W]hat are the lexical rules?

Yoder's argument is against theodicy, strictly speaking. This is the narrow sense Zachary Braiterman mentions in (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (1998). He writes, "Theodicy is a familiar technical term, coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to mean 'the justification of God.' " In his book, Braiterman coins the term "antitheodicy" meaning "refusing to justify, explain, or accept" the relationship between "God (or some other form of ultimate reality), evil, and suffering."

Braiterman uses the term "in order to account for a particular religious sensibility, based (in part) on fragments selectively culled from classical Jewish texts, that dominates post-Holocaust Jewish thought." Braiterman asserts, "Although it often borders on blasphemy, antitheodicy does not constitute atheism; it might even express stubborn love that human persons have for God. After all, the author of a genuine antitheodic statement must believe that an actual relationship subsists between God and evil in order to reject it; and they must love God in order to be offended by that relationship." (Though again, it must be recognized that there is a presumptive bent in this assertion: it is not God that such people would love in order to be thus offended, but rather good. The whole basis of theodicy, if it is to be regarded as a genuine intellectual pursuit and not a rationalizing source of pro-God cheerleading propaganda, is that God just might be distinguishable from good. As a discipline, theodicy by all means ought to logically demonstrate that there is such a distinction or there isn't, and to carefully explain why or why not. It is disappointing that historically it has done neither.)

Two of the Jewish post-Shoah thinkers that Braiterman cites as antitheodicists--Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubinstein--are also cited by Yoder. Yoder describes their approach as "the Jewish complaint against God, dramatically updated (and philosophically unfolded) since Auschwitz ... The faithful under the pogrom proceed with their prayers, after denouncing JHWH/Adonai for what He has let happen." Yoder sees this as a valid form of discourse in the mode of theodicy but he claims it is "the opposite of theodicy."

The conclusions of such so-called anti-theodicists can be summed up as follows:

  1. The contradictions inherent in our universe preclude the possibility that an omnibenevolent God could exist. We can try to build towers of rationalization that "explain" the "real" reasons why bad things happen and assert vainly that our own perspective on what is good is unimportant, but these are not convincing arguments. Those who say plainly that, if God is omnipotent, then he cannot be deemed benevolent because of the evil present in the world, are thus correct.
  2. With that in mind, a being or entity that fulfills the criteria established when asking "if God be God" cannot exist.
  3. In conclusion, a being or entity claiming to have those characteristics is simply lying.
  4. Assuming that lying is by definition not good, such an entity would not qualify as good.

It seems we need to distinguish between two varieties of "antitheodicy":

  1. one of which dismisses the very notion that humanity has any right to judge God (but not giving any reason for this assertion beyond "if God be God", which any freshman logic student recognizes as an act of assuming one's conclusion by declaring the nature of God as an a priori),
  2. the other of which reaches a conclusion contrary to what the "pro-theodicists" desire to reach.

Given that the nature of objective intellectual pursuit requires that those seeking answers must not have a desired conclusion already mapped out in advance, perhaps we need a new word to describe the objective discipline of determining God's associations (or lack thereof) with good.

Hindu answers to the problem of evil[edit]

  • Hindu philosophers, especially those from the Vedanta school have also attempted to craft solutions to the problem of evil. The whole notions of karma and reincarnation were possible explanations. Shri Madhvacharya, with his beliefs of dualism, has crafted his own solutions to the problem of evil that persists in spite of an all-loving omnipotent supreme Being.
  • Events thought to be evil are not really so (such as deaths by natural disaster). God's divine plan is good. What we see as evil is not really evil; rather, it is part of a divine design that is actually good. Our limitations prevent us from seeing the big picture.
  • God's ultimate purpose is to glorify Himself (which, by definition, He alone is infinitely entitled to, without vanity). He allows evil to exist so that we will appreciate goodness all the more, in the same way that the blind man healed by Jesus appreciated his sight more so than those around him who had never experienced blindness.
  • A perfect God is not only good but also evil, since perfection implies no lacking, including not lacking that which is evil. A lacking of evil would imply that there is something external to his all-encompassing perfection. This is related to monistic philosophies such as advaita, or pantheism.
  • Suffering is educational. It makes us better people.
  • Evil is one way that God tests humanity, to see if we are worthy of His grace.
  • Evil and pain exist in this world only. This world is only a prelude to the afterlife, where no pain will exist. The scales of justice are balanced in the afterlife.


    • Evil is relative to good; neither good nor evil could exist without both existing simultaneously.
  • Karma: All good is balanced by evil, and it is only when we achieve proper balance that our reincarnation ends. This explains why an infant may be born into misery, due to experiences they will have later in that life, or in previous or later lives.
  • Religions such as Gnosticism and Manichaeism, and even some Christian groups, dispense with the issue by embracing various forms of dualism, in which God is opposed by an evil counterpart, and is therefore not omnipotent.